Gathering polling items about China and Japan from 1937 to 2011, we examine how Americans think about these two powerful East Asian countries. Our study investigates American attitudes from two perspectives. First, we analyze the content of polling items asked in the US about China and Japan to track changes in salient issues over a period of over 60 years. Second, by tracking repeated items, we show how American attitudes toward China and Japan have changed over time, both in long-term general favorability, and shorter-term perception of geopolitical, ideological, and economic threat in response to historical events.
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http: //dx.doi.org/10.15206/ajpor.2014.2.1.52 at individual and demographic characteristics. It also requires taking the political and social context of the time into account.
Methods
For our research and data collection, we relied on the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research iPoll Databank. From the Databank, we gathered polling items from 1937 to 2011 for Japan and China by searching their country names. The searches resulted in nearly 2,400 polling items for China and over 2,600 for Japan. The results included public opinion polling items on politics, policy matters, and personal tastes gathered from surveys conducted by Gallup, Harris, NORC at the University of Chicago, ABC and CBS News, and the Associated Press, among other organizations. Table 1 shows the number of polling items by country and decade. 1930s  18  1930s  30  1940s  131  1940s  360  1950s  220  1950s  30  1960s  105  1960s  13  1970s  403  1970s  105  1980s  261  1980s  859  1990s  455  1990s  986  2000s  620  2000s  164  2010s  178  2010s  88  Total  2391 Total 2635
Results
First, broad trends emerge from the content of the questions asked about China and Japan between 1937 and 2011. These trends reflect American elite perception of the social and political global environment as well as U.S. interests abroad. From 1939 From to 1945 instance, war with the United States was the dominant topic for polling items about Japan.
Other common questions followed the same trend. Following the war, the focus lied in on the Asian economy in the future, 38% of respondents chose the United States, followed by Japan at 32% and China at 23% (Table 3) . While some poll items were only asked on one occasion, a number of 'baseline' items were repeated over a long period of time. By tracking repeated items, we can show how American attitudes toward China and Japan have changed over time, both in short term attitudes about specific issues, and in long term general favorability. One of the most dramatic short term trends was the change in attitudes about economic might during and after the global financial crash in 2008. Before the crash in 2008, a high of 48% of Americans responded that the U.S. was the leading economic power, followed by
China at 26% and Japan at 10%. Three years later in 2011, China was the top choice at 43%, followed by the U.S. at 38% and Japan at 6%. In 2000, when asked which country they expect to be the world's leading economic power in 20 years, 55% of respondents chose the United States, with China at 15% and Japan at 13%. When the same question was asked in 2011, China was the top choice at 47%, the U.S. had dropped to 35%, and Japan was at 5% (Table 4) . Another trend in polling data is that Americans do not conflate economic and political dominance. Interestingly, in 1994, when asked which country was most powerful politically, 67% of respondents selected the United States, compared to Japan at 7% and China at 4% (Table 5) . When a subsequent question was asked about which country was most powerful economically, 42% of respondents selected the United States, followed by Japan at 39% and China at 3% (Table 6 ). American perceptions of Japan's relative economic power peaked near this 1994 survey, whereas perceptions of China's economic power peaked in the 2000s. 
Japan
In addition to the selection of short-term trends described, many questions were asked across multiple decades, and are useful for tracking long-term trends. These long-term trends focus primarily on U.S. attitudes toward China and Japan, their people, government, and policies. Long-term sentiment toward Japan shows a general upward trend, beginning with strongly unfavorable sentiments during World War II. Poll items during the war did not ask about favorability toward Japan, but rather asked respondents to decide whether the Japanese government or the Japanese people where the primary enemy of the United States. In the later years of the war-1944 and 1945-up to 46% of respondents identified either the "people" or "both government and people" as the "chief enemy" of the United States (Table 7 ). Polling data shows that sentiment toward Japan improves after the war, and then begins to hold fairly steady. (Figure 1 ). Table 7 Enemy is government or the people Potomac Associates and Opinion Dynamics: "In the war with Japan, do you feel that our chief enemy is the Japanese government, or the Japanese people as a whole?" Figure 1
American Perception of Japan as a Dependable Ally
Gallup: "In your opinion, do you think Japan is or is not a dependable ally or friend of the United States?" Total N: 49,711
In data from another poll item, asked 39 times from 1978 to 2011, sentiment appears fairly stable with only short-term disruptions. For the question, "Is your overall opinion of Japan very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?," the majority of respondents answered either "mostly favorable" or "very favorable." Overall opinion was most favorable to Japan in 1979, with 32% of Americans responding that their overall opinion of Japan was "very favorable" followed by 50%
reporting it was "mostly favorable". The lowest favorable sentiment was 4% in 1995.
This low point is likely attributable to trade disputes including a dispute over auto import tariffs. Favorability recovered quickly: by 1999, 75% of respondents indicated either "mostly favorable" or "very favorable" when asked about Japan ( Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research -ISSN 2288 -6168 (Online) Vol. 2 No.1 November 2014 63 http: //dx.doi.org/10.15206/ajpor.2014.2.1.52 Data from other poll items confirm the early 1990s as an outlier when compared to fairly stable long-term sentiment. For the above-mentioned poll item tracking whether or not Japan is a dependable ally, the answer "is not dependable" received the highest response rate from 1990 to 1994. In response to another item about allies, the number of Americans reporting Japan as a close ally drops during the early 1990s, but picks up again to record highs in the 2000s.
Perception of Japan as a legitimate economic competitor follows roughly the same long-term trends as overall favorability, with a corresponding decline in the 1990s. According to an NBC poll that asked "When it comes to economic power, which country is in a stronger position -the U.S. (United States) or Japan?," in 1990 73% of respondents selected Japan and 20% selected the United States. However, by 1998, this had almost reversed: 66% of respondents selected the United States, 24% selected Japan (Table 10) . Similarly, Americans decreasingly viewed Japan's economic competition as a critical threat: The percentage of Americans with this view dropped from 60% in 1990 to 29% in 2002 (Table 11 ). The percent who responded that Japan practices unfair trade with the United States also drastically decreased during these years, from 71% in 1990 to 41% in 2002 (Table 12) . toward China is more heavily influenced by economic and national security considerations than concerns for human rights and democracy. Americans' favorability toward China was more than twice as high in the years surrounding the controversies over political freedom and rights at Tiananmen Square in 1989 than in the past decade.
Beginning after Mao's death in the 1970s, changes in favorability track much more closely with China's economic rise than with the salience of humanitarian concerns (Figure 2 ). Given the number of variables that could influence overall favorability, it is difficult to determine without more research whether human rights issues are improving and how that is related to perceptions of China. 
Conclusion
The polling data on American attitudes toward China and Japan contains a wealth of information, from which we have highlighted only a few interesting findings. The content of the poll items are fascinating markers of moments in history as well as indicators of the current climate. The short-and long-term trends also provide tremendous insight on how public opinion changes and how foreign policy choices will be perceived domestically. While difficult to predict, it is also interesting to speculate on how public opinion in the U.S. toward Japan and China will change in the future:
whether perceptions toward China will begin to look more like those toward Japan, and if public opinion will ultimately depend on their economic success.
